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FLYING BLIND:
THE LACK OF UNIFORMITY IN FEDERAL
PLEADING AFTER TWOMBLY AND IQBAL
RYAN CHARLSON*
I.

THE DEATH OF A PLEADING STANDARD

Conley's "no set of facts" language has been questioned, criticized,
and explained away long enough

. . . and after puzzling the

profession for 50 years, this famous observation has earned its
retirement.'
If Conley's "no set of facts" language is to be interred, let it not be
without a eulogy. That exact language, which the majority says has
"puzzl[ed] the profession for 50 years," has been cited as authority in
a dozen opinions of this Court and four separate writings. In not one
of those 16 opinions was the language "questioned," "criticized," or
"explained away." Indeed, today's opinion is the first by any Member
of this Court to express any doubt as to the adequacy of the Conley
2
formulation.
Congress granted the Supreme Court the power to establish
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (the "Federal Rules"), 3 which
govern pleadings in federal court. 4 Ever since the power to
promulgate the Federal Rules was delegated to the Court,
commentators have disagreed about the Court's role in
interpreting them. 5 Regardless of the debate, the Court has freely

* J.D., The John Marshall Law School. B.A., B.S., Drake University.
Editor-in-Chief, The John Marshall Law Review, 2010-2011. The author would
like to thank Diane Kaplan, Marc Ginsberg, and Justin Schwartz for their
assistance on this Comment.
1. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 562-63 (2007).
2. Id. at 577-78 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
3. See 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2006) (stating that the Supreme Court has the
power to make rules related to procedure and evidence in the district and
appellate courts); see also Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., Inc., 312 U.S. 1, 9-10
(1941) (holding that Congress may exercise the power of regulating the
procedure of the federal courts by delegating the authority to make rules to
the Supreme Court or other courts).
4. See FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a) (stating that "a pleading ... must contain: (1) a
short and plain statement of the grounds for the court's jurisdiction . .. ; (2) a
short and plain statement of the claim showing the pleader is entitled to relief;
and (3) a demand for relief sought. . . .").
5. Compare Karen Nelson Moore, The Supreme Court's Role in
Interpretingthe Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,44 HASTINGS L.J. 1039, 1093
(1993) (suggesting that the Court should have the power to interpret the
485
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interpreted the Federal Rules since their inception, and the rule
regarding pleading has been no exception.6
According to Rule 8 of the Federal Rules, "a pleading that
states a claim for relief must contain a short and plain statement
of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief."7 The
Court gives the Federal Rules their plain meaning, and the Court's
inquiry into them is complete if they find the text clear and
unambiguous.8 Although the words of Rule 8 may seem clear and
unambiguous, the Court has recently changed their meaning.9 And
in doing so, it ignored over fifty years of precedent.1 0
This Comment will begin by exploring the Federal Rules of
Federal Rules freely because of the Court's role in promulgating them), with
Catherine T. Struve, The Paradoxof Delegation:Interpretingthe FederalRules
of Civil Procedure, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1099, 1102 (2002) (suggesting that the
delegation of rulemaking authority should constrain the Court's interpretation
of the Federal Rules).
6. See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957) (holding that a
complaint should not be dismissed unless no set of facts can be proved to
entitle a plaintiff to relief); see also Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506,
508 (2002) (holding that an employment discrimination claim does not need to
contain specific facts, but only a short and plain statement showing that the
plaintiff is entitled to relief); Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (holding that although
a complaint does not need detailed factual allegations, it requires more than
labels and conclusions); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (holding
that a complaint must contain enough factual information to show that it is
plausible that a plaintiff is entitled to relief).
7. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2).
8. Bus. Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Commc'n Enter., Inc., 498 U.S. 533, 54041 (1991).
9. Compare Conley, 355 U.S. at 47 (holding that Rule 8 requires a
statement of the claim that will give a defendant fair notice of what the claim
is and what grounds upon which it rests), with Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949
(holding that the pleading standard of Rule 8 does not require factual
allegations, but it does require sufficient factual matter to state a claim that is
plausible).
10. See, e.g., Glus v. Brooklyn E. Dist. Terminal, 359 U.S. 231, 235 (1959)
(citing Conley, 355 U.S. at 47-48) (holding that although the petitioner's
complaint may have been too vague, that is not grounds for dismissing his
action); see also Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 422-23 (1969) (citing
Conley, 355 U.S. at 45-46) (stating that the petitioner's complaint, although
inartfully drawn, should not be dismissed unless he could prove no set of facts
that would entitle him to relief); McLain v. Real Estate Bd. of New Orleans,
Inc., 444 U.S. 232, 246 (1980) (citing Conley, 355 U.S. at 45-46) (reversing an
appellate court's dismissal of a claim and holding that Conley's no set of facts
standard applies to Sherman Act claims); Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty.
Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993) (citing
Conley, 355 U.S. at 47) (holding that the heightened pleading standards of
Rule 9(b) do not apply to § 1983 actions against municipalities under the
concept of expressio unius est exclusio alterius); Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 512
(citing Conley, 355 U.S. at 47) (reversing the appellate court's dismissal of
petitioner's complaint and holding that the appellate court's higher pleading
standard for employment discrimination cases conflicted with Rule 8 and
Conley).
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Civil Procedure. It will pay particular attention to Rule 8 and how
the Supreme Court has interpreted its meaning over time. The
section will end with a discussion of the new pleading standard set
forth in Twombly 1 and expanded in Iqbal.12 Next, by examining
how the new pleading standard is being applied in different
circuits, this Comment will illustrate that there is no longer a
uniform pleading standard. It will discuss the ramifications of this
lack of uniformity and will show how the Supreme Court erred by
ignoring the process of amending the Federal Rules and by not
following precedent. Lastly, this Comment will propose that a new,
uniform pleading standard be created by rewriting Rule 8.
II. THE

EVOLUTION OF FEDERAL PLEADING

A. From King to Code

The first pleading system was the English common law
system. 13 At early common law, if someone had a grievance with
another, he sought justice from the king, who would issue a writ.14
Eventually, as the common law developed, a plaintiff had to fit his
claim into one of eleven categories 15 and then choose between a
court of law or a court of equity.16 The common law pleading
system had its issues, one of which was providing many
advantages to a defendant.1 7 Moreover, "the pleading contest was
the primary source of dispute resolution, and the 'trial itself was

11. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570 (holding that the plaintiffs claims must
be dismissed because they did not state enough facts to move the complaint
across the line from conceivable to plausible).
12. See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1953 (stating that the Court's "decision in
Twombly expounded the pleading standard for all civil actions.").
13. See JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES AND

MATERIALS 465 (Revised 9th ed. 2008) (illustrating that modern pleading
traces its roots to the English common law system, and that an understanding
of the historical foundations of pleading can lead to a better understanding of
the modern substantive law).
14. See id. at 467 (stating that in order to get before a royal court, the king
would issue a writ, which would order the "person before the king's judges to
answer the complaint.").

15. See Matthew A. Josephson, Some Things Are Better Left Said: Pleading
PracticeAfter Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 42 GA. L. REV. 867, 872 n.25
(2008) (citing ALLAN IDES & CHRISTOPHER N. MAY, CIVIL PROCEDURE: CASES

AND PROBLEMS 526 (2003)) (listing the eleven categories as trespass, trespass
on the case, debt, detinue, replevin, trover, ejectment, covenant, account,
special assumpsit, and general assumpsit).
16. Id. at 873.
17. See id. at 873-74 (listing the advantages to the defendant in the
common law pleading system including: the limited number of categories the
complaint had to fit into, selecting the proper forum, separating issues of law
from issues of fact, and providing the defendant with all the information
needed to bring a defense at the pleading stage).
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something of an afterthought."'1 8
In the mid-nineteenth century, both England and the United
States recognized the inadequacies of the common law pleading
system, and efforts were undertaken to reform it.19 In England, an
Act of Parliament, known as the Hilary Rules, both reduced the
number of defenses allowed under a plea and restored special
pleading. 20 In the United States, the state of New York enacted a
Code of Civil Procedure, known as the Field Code, which served as
a model that many other states followed. 21 The Field Code
contributed greatly to the law of procedure, and its influence can
be seen in the Federal Rules to this day. 22 The Field Code required
a plaintiffs complaint to provide facts showing the cause of action
and a demand for relief. 23 What was thought to be simple in
theory, however, was not in reality, and the Field Code was
abandoned for an even simpler form of pleading. 24
B. The Solution Arrives
The Federal Rules came into effect on September 16, 1938.25
The process of their formation began in 1934 when Congress
passed the Rules Enabling Act, which gave the Supreme Court the
18. Id. at 874 (quoting Richard L. Marcus, The Revival of Fact Pleading
Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 433, 437
(1986)).
19. See FRIEDENTHAL ET AL, supra note 13, at 501-02 (stating that
procedural reform began in England between 1825 and 1834, culminating with
what became known as the Hilary Rules. In the United States, the New York
Constitution of 1846 called for a revision of the civil procedure within the
state).
20. Id. at 502 (citing 2 C. & M. 1-30, 149 Eng.Rep. 651-63 (1834)).
21. See id. (stating that the Field Code served as a prototype for similar
codes in more than half of the states and as a precursor to the Federal Rules);
see also Josephson, supra note 15, at 874 (stating that the Field Code was a
model of reform for more than half of the states, and some states retain parts
of it to this day).
22. See Josephson, supra note 15, at 874 (citing ALLAN IDES &
CHRISTOPHER N. MAY, CIVIL PROCEDURE: CASES AND PROBLEMS 535 (2003))

(suggesting that the Field Code's contributions to procedural law can be found
in the Federal Rules and include: "(1) the merger of courts of law and equity;
(2) the creation of a single cause of action: the civil action; (3) the liberal rules
regarding joinder of claims and parties; and (4) limiting the types of pleadings
to complaints, answers, demurrers, and replies.").
23. See FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supranote 13, at 505 (quoting N.Y.Laws 1849,
c. 438, § 142) (stating that "the complaint shall contain: ... (2) a statement of
the facts constituting the cause of action, in ordinary and concise language ...
; (3) a demand of the relief, to which the plaintiff supposes himself entitled. If
the recovery of money be demanded, the amount thereof shall be stated.").
24. See Josephson, supra note 15, at 875 (stating that the distinctions
between facts needed for pleading purposes and those that were evidence of
legal conclusions resulted in a system that did not promote "a resolution of
disputes on the merits").
25. FRIEDENTHAL ETAL., supra note 13, at 511.
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power to make rules for the federal courts. 26 The Court began the
rule-making process by appointing an advisory committee of
lawyers, law professors, and judges pursuant to another section of
the Act.27 The advisory committee submitted a final report in 1937
after receiving public feedback on two previous drafts. 28 fter
reviewing the proposed rules and making a number of changes,
the Court submitted them to Congress in early 1938.29 Congress
took no action on the rules, so they became effective when it
adjourned pursuant to the Rules Enabling Act.30 The scope and
purpose of the Federal Rules is articulated in Rule 1,31 and the
general rules of pleading are set forth in Rule 8.32
C. The Life and Times of Rule 8
1. Rule 8 Defined by the Other FederalRules

In keeping with the spirit of the Federal Rules articulated in
Rule 1,33 Rule 8(a)(2) calls for "a short and plain statement of the
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief."34 Moreover,
Rule 8(e) states that "pleadings must be construed so as to do
justice."35 The more liberal pleading standards of Rule 8 were
adopted in response to the failed pleading systems of the common
law and the Field Code. 36 The pleading standards of old, however,
26. See 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a) (authorizing the Supreme Court "to prescribe
general rules of practice and procedure and rules of evidence for cases in the
United States district courts.").
27. See 28 U.S.C. § 2073(a)(2) (2006) (stating that the Court "may authorize
the appointment of committees to assist [them] by recommending rules to be
prescribed under section[] 2072 . . . . Each such committee shall consist of

members of the bench and the professional bar, and trial and appellate
judges.").
28. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 13, at 511.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. See FED. R. Civ. P. 1 (stating that the "rules govern the procedure in all
civil actions and proceedings in the United States district courts ..

.

. They

should be construed and administered to secure the just, speedy, and
inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding.").
32. See FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a).
33. See FED. R. Civ. P. 1 (stating the purpose and scope of the Federal
Rules).
34. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2).
35. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(e).
36. See generally FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 13, at 465-513
(explaining the history of pleading from the writs of eleventh-century England,
the evolution of the common law, the Hilary Rules of 1834, the Field Code and
Code Pleading, and the formation of the Federal Rules and suggesting that the
liberal pleading standard was a direct result of the earlier failed pleading
standards); see also Josephson, supra note 15, at 872-78 (giving a summary of
pleading history including the common law pleading system and the Field
Code with comparisons to the Federal Rules and suggesting that Rule 8 was
adopted because experience had showed that the specificity of fact pleading
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served multiple important purposes,37 and the Federal Rules were
drafted with this in mind. For example, in order to discourage
baseless or improper claims,38 Rule 11 requires that pleadings be
signed;3 9 in order for relevant facts to be discovered, Rule 26
provides for liberal discovery; 40 and in order for a court to have the
ability to screen out a claim on the merits before it reaches the
trial stage, Rule 56 provides for summary judgment. 41 Clearly, the
drafters of the Federal Rules saw Rule 8's primary function as
providing notice to the other party. 42
2. Rule 8 Defined by the Supreme Court
a. The Birth of Conley's "No Set of Facts" Standard
Almost immediately after the Federal Rules were adopted,
courts began to clarify the meaning of Rule 8.43 For instance, in

did not provide relief on the merits).
37. See FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 13, at 513 (listing the four
traditional functions of pleadings as: "(1) providing notice of the nature of a
claim or defense; (2) identifying baseless claims; (3) setting each party's view
of the facts; and (4) narrowing the issues.").
38. See FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b) (stating that, by presenting a pleading to a
court, a party certifies: (1) there is not an improper purpose; (2) the claims are
warranted by law; (3) the facts have support through evidence and; (4) denials
are based on evidence).
39. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11(a) (requiring that "every pleading, written
motion, and other paper must be signed by at least one attorney of record in
the attorney's name-or by a party personally if the party is unrepresented.
The paper must state the signer's address, e-mail address, and telephone
number.").
40. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) (stating that the "[p]arties may obtain
discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's
claim or defense.").
41. See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a) (stating that "[t]he court shall grant summary
judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.").
42. See FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 13, at 513 (suggesting that the
other Federal Rules have taken the place of the prior functions of pleading
except providing notice to the other party); see also Josephson, supra note 15,
at 876 (suggesting that under the Federal Rules, the main purpose of
pleadings is notice); JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 1
8 App.01 (2009) (stating that the policy behind Rule 8 is notice-pleading).
43. See, e.g., Leimer v. State Mut. Life Assurance Co., 108 F.2d 302, 306
(8th Cir. 1940) (holding that a complaint should not be dismissed for
insufficiency of statement unless there is certainty that a plaintiff would not
be entitled to relief under "any state of facts which could be proved in support
of the claim"); see also Dioguardi v. Durning, 139 F.2d 774, 775 (2d Cir. 1944)
(stating that the pleading requirement under the Federal Rules does not
require stating "facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action"); Cont'l
Collieries, Inc. v. Shober, 130 F.2d 631, 635 (3d Cir. 1942) (holding that the
function of a complaint under the Federal Rules is to provide notice to the
defendant of the basis and nature of the claim).
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1940, in Leimer v. State Mutual Life Assurance Co.,44 the Eighth
Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal of the plaintiffs
complaint stating that, even if proving her claim was improbable,
she was entitled to try.45 Then, in 1942, in Continental Collieries,
Inc. v. Shober,46 the Third Circuit relied on Leimer when it
reversed the district court's dismissal of the plaintiffs breach of
contract claim.47 Similarly, in 1944, in Dioguardiv. Durning,48 the
Second Circuit unequivocally rejected the notion that facts
necessary to state a cause of action had to be pled in order to
survive a motion to dismiss. 49 It is within the context of these
cases that the Supreme Court took up the issue of what was
required by Rule 8.50
b. The Life of Conley's "No Set of Facts" Standard
In 1957, the Supreme Court made it clear that fact-pleading
was dead. 51 In Conley v. Gibson,52 the Court coined the term
44. 108 F.2d at 306.
45. The Eighth Circuit reasoned that the district court did not understand
the purpose and effect of dismissing the complaint, and that the lower court
was focused on whether the plaintiff would prevail instead of whether the
complaint "stated a claim upon which relief could be granted." Id. at 304.
46. 130 F.2d at 635.
47. The defendant in this case moved to dismiss stating that the contract
which formed the basis for the claim was unenforceable. Id. at 632. The Third
Circuit reasoned that the defendant's argument should have been pled as an
affirmative defense and the motion to dismiss should have been denied. Id. at
636.
48. 139 F.2d at 775.
49. The complaint in this case was written by a pro se plaintiff who alleged
negligence when his merchandise was allegedly sold for a lower price by the
defendant. Id. at 774-75. The district court dismissed the action stating that it
"fail[ed] to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action." Id. at 774.
When the Third Circuit reversed the decision of the district court they cited
the language of Rule 8(a). Id. at 775.
50. See Conley, 355 U.S. at 46 n.5 (citing Leimer, Continental Collieries,and
Dioguardias support for the holding in the case).
51. See id. at 47 (holding that "the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not
require a claimant to set out in detail the facts upon which he bases his
claim.").
52. This class action lawsuit was originally brought in a federal district
court in Texas by black railroad employees who alleged that the defendants,
the union that the workers belonged to and some of its officials, had violated
their right to fair representation because the union gave better protection to
whites in the area of discriminatory discharges. Id. at 42-43. The district court
dismissed the complaint for jurisdictional reasons, and the Fifth Circuit
affirmed. Id. at 43-44. The Supreme Court reversed the Fifth Circuit on the
question of jurisdiction, and then went on to address the two other reasons for
dismissal cited by the defendants: (1) the lack of an indispensable party
defendant; and (2) "failing to state a claim upon which relief could be given."
Id. at 43-45. It was during the analysis of the defendant's motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim that most of the language and holdings relevant to this
discussion were articulated by the Court. Id. at 45-48.
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"notice-pleading" and articulated that all the Federal Rules
required in a complaint is fair notice to the defendant "of what the
plaintiffs claim is and the grounds upon which it rests."53 The
Court went on to define Rule 8 and stated that a "complaint should
not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears
beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support
of his claim which would entitle him to relief."5 4 The "no set of
facts" standard lived on for fifty years,5 5 was cited as authority in
numerous federal cases, 56 and served as the standard for dismissal
of a complaint in twenty-six states and the District of Columbia.5 7
And then, one day, it was gone.
c. The Death of Conley's "No Set of Facts" Standard
The first blow to the "no set of facts" standard came in 2007.
In Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,5 8 the Supreme Court suggested
that the "no set of facts" standard was being replaced with a
"plausibility" standard.5 9 Specifically, the Court stated that the
plaintiffs needed to plead enough facts to nudge their claim "across
the line from conceivable to plausible." 60 The Court attacked
Conley's "no set of facts" language stating that it "is best forgotten
as an incomplete, negative gloss on an accepted pleading
standard."6 1 The Court, however, never provided a definition of the
new standard, 62 so the question became when the "plausibility"

53. Id. at 47.
54. Id. at 45-46.
55. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 562-63 (stating that Conley's "no set of facts"
standard has been the standard for fifty years).
56. See supra note 10 (showing a selection of cases over a forty-year span
that have cited Conley as authority).
57. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 577-78 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
58. This class action lawsuit was brought by subscribers of local telephone
and Internet services against local carriers alleging that they were
participating in parallel conduct in order to stifle competition in violation of
the Sherman Act. Id. at 550-51. The United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York dismissed the complaint stating that
"allegations of parallel business conduct, taken alone, do not state a claim
under [the Sherman Act]." Id. at 552. The court went on to say that the
plaintiff would need to allege additional facts. Id. The Second Circuit reversed
the district court holding that they applied the wrong standard using the "no
set of facts" language of Conley. Id. at 553. The Supreme Court stated that
they granted certiorari to "address the proper standard for pleading an
antitrust conspiracy through allegations of parallel conduct," and, after
review, they reversed the Second Circuit and dismissed the complaint. Id.
59. See id. at 557 (stating that pleadings in the case needed allegations that
plausibly suggest agreement).
60. Id. at 570.
61. Id. at 563.
62. See generally Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (showing that "plausibility" is
never defined).
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standard applied and what it meant. 63
The legal community did not have to wait long to find out
when the new standard applied. In May 2009, in Ashcroft v.
Iqbal,64 the Court held that because Twombly was an
interpretation of Rule 8, it "govern[ed] the pleading standard in all
civil actions."65 The Court cited Twombly throughout its decision
and made it clear that Twombly's "plausibility" standard had
replaced Conley's "no set of facts" standard for good.66 However,
the opinion did not specify a test to determine when a complaint is
"plausible," but instead stated that doing so would be a "contextspecific task that [would] require[] the reviewing court to draw on
its judicial experience and common sense."6 7 It is that ambiguous
language and lack of guidance by the Court in determining when a
complaint is "plausible" that has led to lower courts flying blind.
d. The Resurrection of Conley?
On July 22, 2009, shortly after the decision of the Supreme
Court in Iqbal,68 former Senator Arlen Specter of Pennsylvania
introduced a bill entitled the Notice Pleading Restoration Act of
2009.69 The bill's purpose was to reestablish Conley's "no set of
facts" standard as the pleading standard in federal courts and
63. See, e.g., Saritha Komatireddy Tice, Recent Developments: A "Plausible"
Explanation of Pleading Standards, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 827, 827-30
(2008) (suggesting that the term "plausibility" is ambiguous and lower courts
will determine its meaning); see also Ettie Ward, The Futureof Pleadingin the
Federal System: Debating the Impact of Bell Atlantic v. Twombly: The AfterShocks of Twombly: Will We "Notice" Pleading Changes?, 82 ST. JOHN'S L.
REv. 893, 905 (2008) (stating that over 9400 court cases have not completely
worked out what "plausibility" means); Damon Amyx, The Toll of Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly: An Argument For Taking the Edge Off the Advantage Given
Defendants, 33 VT. L. REV. 323, 323 (2008) (stating that the decision in
Twombly has caused disagreement among the courts about its meaning).
64. This lawsuit was brought by a man, who was detained after the
September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, against former Attorney General John
Ashcroft and other government officials alleging that he was detained because
of his race, religion, or national origin in violation of the Constitution. Iqbal,
129 S. Ct. at 1943-44. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss based on
qualified immunity, and the district court denied the motion using Conley's
"no set of facts" language. Id. The Second Circuit affirmed stating that the "no
set of facts" standard did not apply, but that Twombly called for factual
allegations only when needed to make a claim "plausible." Id. The Court
granted certiorari to address the correct pleading standard at the request of
an appellate court concurrence and reversed. Id. at 1945.
65. Id. at 1953.
66. See generally Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (citing to Twombly's "plausibility"
standard throughout the case).
67. Id. at 1950.
68. See id. (showing that the Supreme Court decided the case on May 18,
2009).
69. S. 1504, 111th Cong. (2009) (as introduced by Sen. Arlen Specter, July
22, 2009).
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undo the Supreme Court's decisions in Twombly and Iqbal.70
Specifically, the bill stated that "a federal court shall not dismiss a
complaint under rule 12(b)(6)71 or (e) 7 2 of the Federal Rules ... ,
except under the standards set forth by the Supreme Court . .. in
Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957)."73 In his introductory
remarks, Mr. Specter stated that the reason he proposed the bill
was because the recent decisions "effectively authorized federal
judges to indulge their 'subject[ive] judgments' in evaluating an
allegation's plausibility."74 He also expressed discomfort with how
the Supreme Court arbitrarily created a new pleading standard
and ignored the process of amending the Federal Rules. 75
III. THE CURRENT STATE OF FEDERAL PLEADING

An analysis of how the lower courts are interpreting the
"plausibility" standard illustrates that federal judges are indeed
"indulg[ing] their subject[ive] judgments in evaluating an
allegation's plausibility."76 Examining how the Federal Rules are
amended and when the Supreme Court normally overturns
precedent will show that the Court did indeed ignore the process of
amending the Federal Rules when it changed the pleading
standards.
A.

What Are PlausibleFacts?Depends on Who You Ask

1. Approaches Related to Fact-Pleading
A case from the Eleventh Circuit sums up the confusion.77 In
Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co.,78 the court was considering a
complaint of conspiracy between a trade union leaders' employer
70. See id. (stating that the purpose of the bill is to ensure that federal
courts will not dismiss complaints under any standard except the one
expounded by the Supreme Court in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957)).
71. See FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (stating that a party may assert by motion
that a complaint "fail[s] to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.").
72. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(e) (allowing a party to bring a motion for a more
definitive statement if a pleading "is so vague and ambiguous that the party
cannot reasonably prepare a response.").
73. S. 1504.
74. 155 CONG. REC. S7871, 7891 (daily ed. July 22, 2009) (statement of Sen.
Specter) (quoting Prof. Stephen Burbank, U. of Penn. Law School).
75. See id. (illustrating that Sen. Specter was concerned that the Supreme
Court did an end run around the process of amending the Federal Rules,
which was designed by Congress and ends "with the Supreme Court
present[ing] a proposed rule change to Congress for approval.").

76. Id.
77. See generally Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., 578 F.3d 1252 (11th Cir.
2009) (containing a discussion of pleading standards where the court cites the
language of Rule 8, but then goes on to say that another standard beside the
one articulated in the rule applies to pleadings in federal cases after Iqbal).

78. Id.
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and the Colombian government.79 During its analysis, the court
stated that Rule 8(a)(2) required "a short and plain statement of
the claim . . . in order to give the defendant fair notice," but added

that "the facts as pleaded must state a claim for relief that is
plausible on its face."80 Ultimately, the court dismissed the
plaintiffs' complaint stating that the facts as pled did not show a
plausible claim.81 The Eleventh Circuit, while acknowledging the
notice-pleading language of Rule 8(a)(2), nonetheless applied a
fact-pleading standard to the complaint in light of Iqbal.
The Second Circuit, where Iqbal originated, 82 has a somewhat
Ikanos
In Panther Partners, Inc. v.
view.
different
Communications, Inc.,83 the court was considering whether a

complaint alleging false statements in connection with an initial
public offering should have been dismissed. 84 Although the court
affirmed the district court, it stated that the district court had
misapplied Twombly because it applied a "practicality" standard
instead of a "plausibility" standard,85 illustrating that
"plausibility" may mean one thing to one court and something
different to another.
In its analysis, the Second Circuit did not discuss the
language of Rule 8, but quoted Twombly and said that "Rule 8
requires that a plaintiff allege in its complaint 'enough facts to
79. This lawsuit was brought by trade union leaders against their employer
under the Alien Tort Statute and the Torture Victims Protection Act for
allegedly collaborating with the Colombian government to murder and torture
the union leaders. Id. at 1257. The district court dismissed the case for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction and for insufficiently pleading factual allegations;
the plaintiffs appealed. Id.
80. See id. at 1268. (showing that the court tried to reconcile the standard
of notice pleading and fact pleading by stating that, although Rule 8(a)(2) only
requires notice to the defendant, at the same time the facts pled must state a
plausible claim).
81. Id. Specifically, the court stated that the reason the facts pled did not
show a plausible claim was because they were vague and conclusory and did
not have to be taken as true for the analysis. Id.
82. See generally Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (showing that the case was granted
review on writ of certiorari to the Second Circuit).
83. No. 08-3398, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 20652 (2d Cir. Sept. 17, 2009)
(unpublished).
84. The plaintiffs here brought suit alleging that the defendant had made
false statements in connection with the company's initial public offering,
violating the Securities Act of 1933. Id. at *2. Specifically, the complaint
alleged that the defendant knew that there was a high failure rate of computer
chips (defendant's product) before the offering. Id. at *4. The district court,
which applied a "particularity" standard, dismissed the complaint. Id. at *2.
Moreover, the district court denied the plaintiffs leave to amend the complaint
and a motion to reconsider. Id. The plaintiffs appealed. Id.
85. Specifically, the court stated that, in order for the plaintiffs' complaint
to be sufficient, it needed only to state that the defendant knew of the
abnormally high failure rates before the offering, not that it knew the failure
rates were twenty-five to thirty percent. Id. at *5.
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state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face."'86 Moreover, the
court articulated that "Twombly and Iqbal raised the pleading
requirements substantially." 87 It seems that the Second Circuit is
more concerned with the language of the Supreme Court's opinions
than with the language of Rule 8.
Like the Second Circuit, the Third Circuit seems to
acknowledge that notice-pleading has given way to a form of factpleading.88 In Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside,89 the court had to
determine whether a district court correctly dismissed an
employment discrimination claim.90 The court focused its analysis
on what it considered the major difference between Conley's "no
set of facts" standard and Twombly and Iqbal's "plausibility"
standard: Pleading legal conclusions alone will not suffice. 9'
The court held that a complaint cannot just allege entitlement
to relief, "it must show such an entitlement with its facts."92 The
Third Circuit reversed the district court, stating that it erred
because it focused on what the plaintiff could prove, not whether
her pleading was appropriate.9 3 Curiously, in a statement that
sounds strikingly similar to notice-pleading, the court opined that
"so long as the complaint notifies the defendant of the claimed
86. Id. at *4 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).
87. Id. at *12. The court announced this in the later part of its opinion
when it granted plaintiff leave to amend the complaint. Id. It also articulated
that it would proceed cautiously in regards to pleading in order to ensure
justice. Id.
88. See Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 209-10 (3d Cir. 2009)
(stating that pleading standards have recently "shifted from simple notice
pleading to a more heightened form ... requiring a plaintiff to plead more
than the mere possibility of relief to survive a motion to dismiss.").
89. Id.
90. The plaintiff in this case was a janitor for a hospital who was injured on
the job and placed on medical leave. Id. at 206. Soon thereafter, the hospital
provided the plaintiff with a job doing clerical work, but the job was later
eliminated and the plaintiff was terminated. Id. The plaintiff then brought
suit against the hospital for violating her rights under the Rehabilitation Act.
Id. at 205. The district court dismissed the complaint finding that it did not
allege a disability under the Rehabilitation Act. Id. The plaintiff appealed the
decision. Id.
91. See id. at 210 (stating that, under Conley's "no set of facts" standard, if
a complaint contained a recitation of a claim's legal elements it could survive a
motion to dismiss and contrasting that with the holding in Twombly, which
stated that a mere recitation of the elements will not be enough to withstand a
motion to dismiss).
92. Id. at 211 (emphasis added).
93. Id. at 213. In addition, because this case was an employment
discrimination matter, the court asked the parties to address whether
Swierkiewicz was still viable. Id. at 211. In that case, the Supreme Court held
that there was not a heightened pleading standard for employment
discrimination claims. Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 514. The court concluded that
because Swierkiewicz relied on Conley, as far as pleading is concerned,
Twombly and Iqbal have repudiated it. Fowler, 578 F.3d at 211.
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impairment, the substantially limited major life activity need not
be specifically identified in the pleading." 9 4 The Third Circuit,
although focused on a form of fact-pleading, still occasionally uses
the language of notice-pleading.
In the Fifth Circuit, the court applies a reasonableness
standard in order to determine whether a complaint is plausible.95
In Gonzalez v. Kay,96 the court considered whether the district
court erred when it dismissed a plaintiffs claim for violation of the
Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA).97 The issue was
whether a letter sent by the attorney defendant and printed on his
letterhead still violated the FDCPA even though it was not signed
and included a disclaimer that it was only being sent for debt
collection purposes.98
In its analysis, the court focused on how reasonable minds
could differ about whether the letter was deceptive as a matter of
law.99 In reversing the district court's decision, the Fifth Circuit
stated that in close cases where reasonable minds could differ
about the facts alleged, further inquiry is needed before a motion
to dismiss can be granted.1 00 This case illustrates that the Fifth
Circuit takes facts pled as plausible when reasonable minds could
differ about their legal outcome-far from a clear standard.
In contrast, the Sixth Circuit seems to use an altogether
different approach. In Hensley Manufacturing v. ProPride,Inc.,01

the court determined whether a complaint can withstand a motion
to dismiss if facts may exist that could entitle a plaintiff to
94. Id. at 214 (emphasis added).
95. See Gonzalez v. Kay, 577 F.3d 600, 603 (5th Cir. 2009) (stating that "a
claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged.") (quoting Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949).
96. 577 F.3d 600 (5th Cir. 2009).
97. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e (2006). The plaintiff in this case had failed to pay his
mobile phone bill, and it was turned over to a collection agency. Gonzalez, 577
F.3d at 601. The collection agency used the defendant's law office to help
collect the debt. Id. The defendant sent the plaintiff a debt collection letter
that was printed on the firm's letterhead but had a disclaimer on the back that
stated that the letter was to be used for collection purposes only and no lawyer
with the firm had reviewed the account. Id. at 602. The plaintiff then brought
suit against the defendant alleging violations of the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act. Id. at 603. The District Court for the Southern District of Texas
dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim, and the plaintiff appealed.

Id.
98. Id. at 602.
99. Id. at 607. Specifically, the court noted that the disclaimer was not in
the body of the letter, but instead was included in the "legalease" on the back
of it. Id. The court reasoned that a consumer could be deceived into thinking
that the letter was actually from a lawyer and that the disclaimer on the back
might not be effective. Id.
100. Id.
101. 579 F.3d 603 (6th Cir. 2009).

498

The John MarshallLaw Review

[44:485

relief.102 The case dealt with trademark infringement and unfair
competition. 103 The plaintiff was concerned that the use of the
name of the inventor of the defendant's product would cause
confusion to consumers because it was the same as the name of the
plaintiffs company. 104 On appeal, the plaintiff stated that "'facts
may exist that establish a level of consumer confusion' and 'facts
may exist that establish that [the inventor's name] is not being
used fairly and in good faith."'1os In affirming the district court's
dismissal of the plaintiffs complaint, the court stated that it did
not matter if facts might exist to support the plaintiffs allegations
because it was the plaintiffs job to allege them in the complaint.106
In contrast to some of the other jurisdictions, the Ninth
Circuit follows a more methodical approach.107 In Moss v. United
States Secret Service,10s the court articulated that Iqbal set out a

two-part approach to pleadings analysis.109 The court understood
the approach as follows: (1) exclude pleadings which are legal
conclusions, then; (2) look at the remaining factual allegations and
determine whether they state a plausible claim for relief." 0
In this case, the court applied the test to plaintiffs' claims of

102. Id. at 613.

103. Both the plaintiff and the defendant in this suit were trailer hitch
manufacturers. Id. at 606. The plaintiff brought suit against the defendant for
trademark infringement and unfair competition when one of their competitors
began selling a trailer hitch, which was designed by the man who had
originally designed one of the plaintiffs trailer hitches. Id. The issue arose
when the defendant began to use the name of the designer of the trailer
hitches, which was also the name of the plaintiffs company. Id. The district
court dismissed the complaint, stating that the defendant's use of the
designer's name "fell under the fair use exception to trademark infringement
claim." Id.
104. Id. at 607.
105. Id. at 613 (emphasis in original).
106. Id. Specifically, the court stated that "mere speculation is insufficient"
under the new pleading standards set forth in Twombly and Iqbal, and that
mere speculation "fail[s] to state claim for relief that is 'plausible on its face."'

Id.
107. See Moss v. United States Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 970 (9th Cir.
2009) (stating that Iqbal laid out a methodical approach that the court follows
it when analyzing pleadings).
108. 572 F.3d 962 (9th Cir. 2009).
109. Id. at 970. The plaintiffs here brought a Bivens class action against two
Secret Service agents alleging constitutional violations when they relocated
their demonstration, which was critical of then-President Bush. Id. at 964-65.
The plaintiffs alleged that when the Secret Service agents moved their antiBush demonstration but left the pro-Bush demonstration similarly situated,
they violated their First Amendment rights. Id. at 965. They went on to allege
that the Secret Service had this policy in place, although it was never written
down on paper. Id. When the district court denied the defendants' motion to
dismiss for qualified immunity, this interlocutory appeal followed. Id.

110. Id. at 970.
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constitutional violations by Secret Service agents.'
The court
determined that most of the plaintiffs' allegations were
conclusory, 112 and only two could be used to determine whether the
claim was plausible. 1 3 The court held that the allegations failed to
suggest a plausible action against the agents because, although
the facts alleged suggested a possibility of wrongdoing, a
possibility of wrongdoing is not enough to overcome a motion to
dismiss.114 The Ninth Circuit, in a way similar to the other
circuits, interprets Twombly and Iqbal to mean that fact-pleading,
in one form or another, has replaced notice-pleading.
2. An Approach Related to Notice-Pleading
So is notice-pleading gone for good? Some cases from the
Seventh Circuit help to shed some light on this question. In Smith
v. Duffey,115 the court was considering whether the district court,
which relied on Twombly, erred in dismissing the plaintiffs suit
for fraud. 16 In its analysis, the court stated that it was initially
"reluctant to endorse the district court's citation" of Twombly
because it dealt with complex litigation and the present case did
not.117 The court went on to acknowledge that Iqbal had expanded
Twombly but pointed out that Iqbal was special in its own way
because it dealt with high level officials, which the Supreme Court
did not want burdened with intrusive discovery.118 In the end, the
court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the complaint, but
when it did so, it suggested that Twombly and Iqbal might not
111. See generally id. (illustrating that the court used the two-part test from
Iqbal to determine whether or not the plaintiffs' complaint passed the
plausibility test).
112. See id. (stating that the agents' alleged impermissible motive-the
alleged Secret Service policy of suppressing speech critical of the Presidentand alleged viewpoint discrimination are all conclusory and do "nothing to
enhance the plausibility" of the complaint).
113. See id. (stating that the non-conclusory claims were that the agents
allegedly moved their demonstration but left the pro-Bush demonstration
alone and that the diners in the inn where the President was were not
screened or asked to leave despite their close proximity to him).
114. Id. at 971-72.
115. 576 F.3d 336 (7th Cir. 2009).
116. Id. The plaintiff in this case sold his interest in a medical-testing
company to another company and received some stock-options as part of the
consideration for the sale. Id. at 337. Three months later, the company filed
for bankruptcy, and the stock options were eliminated as part of the
reorganization. Id. The plaintiff then brought suit against three officers of the
company alleging fraud. Id. The district court dismissed the complaint, and
the plaintiff appealed. Id. at 336.
117. Id. at 339. Specifically, the court stated that Twombly dealt with
complex litigation and was concerned with the high cost of discovery to the
defendant. Id. at 340. In contrast, this was a simple case, and the defendant
would not be burdened with high discovery costs. Id.

118. Id.
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govern in this situation." 9 In suggesting that the "plausibility"
standard might not apply in a case such as this, the court seemed
to be suggesting that a reliance on notice-pleading and the "no set
of facts" standard may sometimes be appropriate.
Another case from the Seventh Circuit seems to confirm that
the circuit is still somewhat focused on notice-pleading. 120 In
Brooks v. Ross,121 the court was deciding whether the district court

properly dismissed the plaintiffs § 1983 claim. 122 The court started
its analysis by stating the language of Rule 8123 and articulating
that that rule "reflects a liberal notice-pleading regime."124 It then
discussed how the general notice-pleading requirement of Rule 8
was not repudiated by Twombly.125 Lastly, it held that Iqbal
illustrated that plaintiffs who do not plead specific facts to ground
their legal claims are not providing the "showing" that Rule 8
requires.126 The court concluded its analysis by synthesizing the
cases into a three-part test, which has its focus in noticepleading.127 When the court applied the test to this case, it found
that the plaintiff did not give the defendant sufficient notice and
affirmed the district court.128
The above cases are just a few examples that highlight the
different ways in which courts are interpreting the new
"plausibility" standard, and there are many others. 129 What
119. See id. (suggesting that the court is unsure whether Twombly and Iqbal
apply in this type of case, but holding that it does not matter because the case
has no merit, regardless).
120. See Brooks v. Ross, 578 F.3d 574, 580 (7th Cir. 2009) (stating that the
question the court is deciding is whether the factual allegations in the
complaint provide sufficient notice to the defendant).
121. 578 F.3d 574 (7th Cir. 2009).
122. Id. at 577. The district court's primary ground for dismissal was that
the plaintiff failed to plead personal involvement by the defendants. Id. at 580.
123. See supra note 3 (stating the requirements of Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal
Rules).
124. Brooks, 578 F.3d at 580.
125. Id. at 581 (citing Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007)).
126. Id.
127. See id. (illustrating the three-part test as providing notice to
defendants, taking facts as true and realizing that some facts are so
implausible that they do not provide notice, and not accepting as true those
factual allegations that are legal conclusions).
128. Id. at 582.
129. See, e.g., Tyree v. Zenk, No. 05-CV-2998, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43872,
at *15-16 (E.D.N.Y. May 22, 2009) (holding that the pleading standard for a
pro se plaintiff is the "no set of facts" standard, while also holding that the pro
se plaintiff in the case needed to plead sufficient factual matter to make the
claim plausible); see also Maldonado v. Fontanes, 568 F.3d 263, 268 (1st Cir.
2009) (stating that because the assessment of qualified immunity at the stage
of a motion to dismiss requires the evaluation of pleadings, the facts pleaded
must show that it is plausible that a clearly established law has been
violated); S. Cherry St., LLC v. Hennessee Group, LLC, 573 F.3d 98, 110 (2d
Cir. 2009) (illustrating that there is a difference in the "plausibility" standard
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becomes clear when synthesizing the cases is that there is no
longer any uniformity in federal pleading.130 Some courts focus on
the language of Rule 8; others on the language of the Supreme
Court's opinions. 13 1 Some courts use a methodical approach; others
a more subjective one. 132 And, although there seems to be a
general consensus that notice-pleading has given way to some sort
of fact-pleading, some courts still incorporate notice-pleading
language into their analyses. 33 Without the uniformity that
existed in federal pleading during the Conley era, courts are
indeed flying blind and indulging their "subject[ive] judgments."1 34
B. Stare Decisis? Who Cares!
"[t]he doctrine of precedent, under which it
Stare
is necessary for a court to follow earlier judicial decisions when the
same points arise again in litigation,"13 6 and it was completely
ignored by the Supreme Court when it decided Twombly and
Iqbal. Although the Court has the authority to ignore the concept
decisis135 is

and the heightened pleading standards imposed by the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4 (2006)); Atherton v. D.C.
Office of the Mayor, 567 F.3d 672, 681 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (holding that, in order
to state a claim for invidious discrimination, a plaintiff must plead factual
allegations that make it plausible that the defendant acted with a
discriminatory purpose).
130. See discussion supra Part III.A. (comparing and contrasting cases from
different circuits and illustrating that each circuit has its own interpretation
of what the new "plausibility" standard means).
131. Compare Sinaltrainal,578 F.3d at 1268 (explaining that the language
of Rule 8 requires a "short and plain statement of the case"), with Panther
Partners, Inc., 2009 LEXIS 20652, at *3-4 (illustrating that the court was
concerned with the language of the Supreme Court opinions in Twombly and
Iqbal and not with the language of Rule 8).
132. Compare Moss, 572 F.3d at 969 (showing that the Ninth Circuit follows
a two-part test when analyzing pleadings), and Brooks, 578 F.3d at 581
(showing the Seventh Circuit follows a three-part test for pleadings analysis),
with Gonzalez, 577 F.3d at 603 (showing that the Fifth Circuit uses a
reasonableness test to determine whether or not a complaint can survive a
motion to dismiss).
133. See, e.g., Fowler, 578 F.3d at 214 (suggesting that the Third Circuit is
still concerned with notice-pleading in some form because it stated the
complaint needed to notify the defendant); see also Smith, 576 F.3d at 340
(suggesting that the Seventh Circuit uses notice-pleading because the court
opined that Twombly and Iqbal did not apply to this case); Brooks, 578 F.3d at
581 (illustrating that the Seventh Circuit uses a three-part test that is
concerned with notice-pleading).
134. See 155 CONG. REC. S7871, supra note 74, at 7891 (suggesting that
courts would be subjective when reviewing complaints without the uniformity
that the Conley's "no set of facts" standard provided).
135. A Latin term meaning "to stand by things decided." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1173 (Abridged 8th ed. 2005).
136. Id.
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of stare decisis and overturn a prior decision,137 it erred in
overturning Conley's "no set of facts" standard because
expectations were upset, it was not recently adopted, and prior
experience with it did not point to shortcomings. 3 8 Moreover, the
new pleading standard has created an environment of arbitrary
decision making and judicial inefficiency-ironically, the two
things stare decisis is designed to prevent.139 The Court itself has
stated that "any departure from the doctrine of stare decisis
demands special justification," 40 but it failed to provide one when
it overturned Conley. This lack of justification has led the legal
community, including Congressmen and Supreme Court justices,
to condemn the Court for its activism and the mess it left behind
because of it.141
IV. THE FUTURE OF FEDERAL PLEADING

Both Congress and the entire legal community can bring back
uniformity in the area of federal pleading. Congress can pass a bill
similar to The Notice Pleading Restoration Act of 2009,142 which
would have re-established Coanley's "no set of facts" standard,
effectively undoing Twombly and Iqbal.143 But the legal
137. See State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 20 (1997) (stating that it is the
Supreme Court alone that can overrule one of its own precedents).
138. See id. (suggesting that a departure from precedent may be appropriate
where expectations are not upset, where the precedent is a judge-made rule
that was recently adopted to improve court operations, and where experience
has pointed to shortcomings).
139. See Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172 (1989)
(quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 490 (Alexander Hamilton) (H. Lodge ed.,
1888)) (stating that "staredecisis is a basic self-governing principle within the
Judicial Branch, which is entrusted with the sensitive and difficult task of
fashioning and preserving a jurisprudential system that is not based upon 'an
arbitrary discretion"'); see also Hubbard v. United States, 514 U.S. 695, 711
(1995) (quoting BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL
PROCESS 149 (1921)) (stating "[als Justice Cardozo reminded us: 'The labor of
judges would be increased almost to the breaking point if every past decision
could be reopened in every case, and one could not lay one's own course of
bricks on the secure foundation of the courses laid by others who had gone
before him."').
140. Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203, 212 (1984).
141. See 155 CONG. REc. S7871, supra note 74, at 7891 (showing that Sen.
Specter was concerned that the Court ignored the process of amending the
Federal Rules); see also Adam Liptak, 9/11 Case Could Bring Broad Shift on
Civil Suits, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/21/us/
21bar.html? r=1 (quoting Justice Ruth Bader Ginsberg: "In my view, the
Court's majority messed up the federal rules."); see also Erwin Chemerinsky,
Moving to the Right, PerhapsSharply to the Right, 12 GREEN BAG 2d 413, 416
(stating that the Court's activism was striking because there was no
amendment to the Federal Rules, there was no new statute changing pleading
standards, and no party asked the Court to make a change).
142. S. 1504.
143. See id. (being introduced by Sen. Specter for the purpose of undoing the
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community should go further. It should utilize the collective mind
of the entire legal world and call upon judges, clerks of court,
lawyers, professors, government agencies, Congresspersons, and
other individuals and organizations to use their creativity and
analytical skills to craft a new Rule 8-one that will address the
flaws in the pleading system without throwing it into chaos-by
utilizing the amendment process proscribed by the Rules Enabling
Act.144
A. The Quick Fix: Re-establish Notice-Pleadingand Conley's
"No Set of Facts" Standard

The legal community could wait for the Supreme Court to
redefine "plausibility" in a way that will not lead to different
outcomes in different circuits. 145 But it should not do so. It took
nineteen years after the Federal Rules were initially established
for the Court to give a clear meaning to the language of Rule 8.146
Litigants simply cannot wait that long for the Court to recreate
the uniform standard in federal pleading that was destroyed with
the overruling of Conley. This country has three branches of
government-each with different areas of power-and a system of
checks and balances to remedy situations where one of the
branches abuses its power. 147 This is one of those situations. The
Supreme Court, through its power of interpreting the Federal
Rules, basically rewrote the pleading standard articulated in Rule
8.148 It was Congress that gave the Court the power to establish
Supreme Court decisions in Twombly and Iqbal and reestablishing the noticepleading standard set forth in Conley).
144. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071-2077 (2006); see STEVEN BAICKER-MCKEE, WILLIAM
M. JANSSEN & JOHN B. CORR, A STUDENT'S GUIDE TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF

CIVIL PROCEDURE 1243-47 (11th ed. 2008) (listing the steps taken to amend
the Federal Rules: (1) consideration by the advisory committee, which includes
considering suggestions for rules changes and drafting of proposed rule
changes, (2) publication and public comment, (3) final approval by the advisory
committee after consideration of the public comments, (4) approval by the
standing committee, (5) judicial conference approval, (6) Supreme Court
approval, and (7) Congressional review).

145. See discussion supra Part III.A. (comparing and contrasting how the

different circuits are interpreting the "plausibility" standard and coming to
different results); see also supra note 129 (providing more examples of how the
courts are interpreting the "plausibility" standard in different ways).
146. See generally Conley, 355 U.S. 41 (showing that the "no set of facts"
standard and the notice-pleading standard were firmly established by the
Court in 1957, nineteen years after the Federal Rules were adopted in 1938).
147. See generally U.S. CONST. arts. I-III (establishing a federal system of
government with an executive, legislative, and judicial branch, each with
different responsibilities, and a system of checks and balances that prevents
one branch from either abusing or obtaining too much power).
148. Compare FED. R. CiV. P. 8(a)(2) (stating that a pleading must contain a
"short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief), with Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556 (holding that a complaint must contain
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and interpret the Federal Rules through the Rules Enabling
Act.149 And it is Congress that must now step in to remedy the
abuse of that power.
The solution has already presented itself in the form of The
Notice Pleading Restoration Act of 2009.150 As noted above, the bill
sought to reestablish uniformity in pleading standards by undoing
the subjective "plausibility" standard of Twombly and Iqbal and
replacing it with the tried and true "no set of facts" standard
established in Conley.151 However, after the bill was introduced, it
was read twice and referred to the Committee on the Judiciary,
but unfortunately, there was no further action on the bill.152
Congress should move quickly to remedy the abuse of power by the
Supreme Court by passing a bill similar to The Notice Pleading
Restoration Act of 2009. Once this type of legislation is passed, the
legal community can turn to the more difficult and time
consuming task of crafting a new federal pleading standard-one
that remedies the current problems in civil litigation.
B. The Right Fix: Create a New Rule 8 through the
Amendment Process

"The pervasive and substantial impact of the rules on the
practice of law in the federal courts demands exacting and
meticulous care in drafting rule changes."15 3 If the Supreme Court
wanted to change the federal pleading standard, it should have
done so by suggesting to the advisory committee for the Federal
Rules that an amendment was necessary.154 Then, by following the
process of amending the Federal Rules articulated by the Rules
Enabling Act,'5 5 the legal community as a whole could have
contributed to the drafting of the new rule and the problems
associated with a lack of uniformity could have been avoided. That
is what needs to happen now.
enough factual matter to show that a claim is plausible), and Iqbal, 129 S. Ct.
at 1952 (holding that even if there are well-pled facts that give rise to
"plausibility," if they are conclusory in nature they do not have to be taken as
true for the purposes of evaluating a motion to dismiss).
149. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071-2077.
150. S. 1504.
151. See discussion supra Part II.C.2.d. (illustrating that the purpose of the
Notice Pleading Restoration Act of 2009 is to reestablish Conley's "no set of
fact" standard).
152. S. 1504; THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, Bill Summary & Status, http://tho
mas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?dlll:SN1504:@@@X (last visited Apr. 5, 2011).
153. STEVEN BAICKER-MCKEE ET AL., A STUDENT'S GUIDE TO THE FEDERAL
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 1244 (11th ed. 2008).
154. See 28 U.S.C. § 331 (authorizing the Judicial Conference of the United
States to recommended amendments or additions to the Federal Rules as part
of its duty to "carry on a continuous study of the operation and effect of the
general rules of practice and procedure.").

155. Id. § 2071.
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Rule 8 should be amended to create a heightened pleading
standard for those causes of action that can potentially lead to
burdensome discovery. It appears the Supreme Court had this in
mind when it created the "plausibility" standard. 156 For example,
in Twombly, the Court stated that, even though a claim that did
not meet the "plausibility" standard could be weeded out early in
the discovery process, this was not a good enough reason to allow
the complaint to survive a motion to dismiss. 5 7 The Court went on
to say that the threat of expensive discovery could push
defendants to settle even frivolous cases before they reached the
summary judgment stage. 58 In Iqbal, the Court flatly rejected the
notion that careful case management in the discovery stage could
free certain officials from the burdens of litigation. 5 9 The Court
was correct to create a higher pleading standard for those cases
that could lead to burdensome and expensive discovery. 6 0 They
were incorrect in creating one that was as prone to subjectivity as
"plausibility" and in expanding it to "all civil actions."161 The
amendment to Rule 8 must correct these errors by requiring factpleading for those causes of action that could require burdensome
or expensive discovery and notice-pleading for all other types of
civil actions.
The "plausibility" standard is fact-pleading 62 in disguise.
Because the Court avoided the process of amending the Federal
Rules, it could not rewrite Rule 8 outright, even though that has
been the effect of the opinions in Twombly and Iqbal.'6s The result
156. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 558 (stating that part of the reason the Court
was dismissing Conley's "no set of facts" standard was that it was "one thing to
be cautious before dismissing an antitrust complaint in advance of discovery,
but quite another to forget that proceeding to antitrust discovery can be
expensive."); see also Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1953 (stating that the qualified
immunity doctrine is in place to free certain officials from the burdens of
litigation, including "disruptive discovery").
157. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 559.
158. Id.
159. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1953.
160. Discovery abuse is a common problem in civil litigation. See generally
Abraham D. Sofaer, Sanctioning Attorneys for Discovery Abuse Under the New
Federal Rules: On the Limited Utility of the Punishment, 57 ST. JOHN'S L.REv.
680 (1983) (highlighting some of the most common problems with the
discovery process including: (1) the fact that the present system requires only
nominal costs to sue and open the gates of discovery; (2) that a party can have
as much discovery as it wants by paying only the costs of seeking it, while the
opposing party pays the costs of compliance and; (3) that the low cost of
seeking discovery leads all parties to engage in excessive discovery).
161. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1953.
162. Fact-pleading is "a procedural system requiring that the pleader allege
merely the facts of the case giving rise to the claim, not the legal conclusions
necessary to sustain the claim." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 970 (Abridged 8th
ed. 2005).
163. See discussion supra Part III.A. (showing that most federal courts have
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was a standard that changes from case to case and from court to
court and is completely dependent on a federal judge's "judicial
experience and common sense." 164 This lack of uniformity in
federal pleading cannot stand. By amending Rule 8, the legal
community can provide a partial remedy to the problems of
burdensome and expensive discovery without shielding the factpleading required to do so behind a vague pleading standard that
creates confusion. Exactly which types of suits should require factpleading should be decided during the first three steps of the rule
making process where the entire legal community comes together
to brainstorm and create.16 5 It seems clear, however, that antitrust
suits and those involving qualified immunity should be on the list
because those were the types of cases the Supreme Court
considered when it developed the "plausibility" standard. Other
types of suits that should be considered include those dealing with
complex commercial litigation, toxic tort, product liability, and
class actions. All other types of suits should require noticepleading, and to avoid confusion, the "no set of facts" standard
from Conley should be incorporated into the new rule.
V. CONCLUSION

The decisions in Twombly and Iqbal overturned over fifty
years of precedent, destroyed uniformity in federal pleading, and
created a pleading standard that is defined only by the subjective
view of the judge reviewing the complaint at issue. Congress
should pass a bill similar to The Notice Pleading Restoration Act
of 2009, and the legal community should work together to amend
Rule 8. Only by amending Rule 8 to require fact-pleading for suits
involving burdensome or expensive discovery and notice-pleading
for all others can uniformity be restored to federal pleading. Only
then can litigants and judges in the federal courts stop flying
blind.

abandoned the notice-pleading language of Rule 8 and are dealing with factpleading in one form or another).
164. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950.
165. See BAICKER-MCKEE ET AL., supra note 153, at 1244-47 (describing the
first three steps of the rule-making process as a collaboration of the entire
legal community, including judges, clerks, lawyers, professors, government
agencies, and others).

